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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY
IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR REHEARING
INTRODUCTION
Appellant has petitioned for a rehearing on
the single ground that the opinion of this court herein did not deal with the issue of "whether or not nonappropriated, non-public funds in the possession of USU
could legally have been used for investment in common
stock, thus rendering the University's contracts with
. . .First Equity not ultra vires."
'• I "

(emphasis added).

"

APPELLANT IS IN ERROR IN CONTENDING THAT THE
OPINION OF THIS COURT DID NOT DEAL WITH THE
ISSUE ON WHICH APPELLANT GROUNDS ITS PETITION
FOR REHEARING.
In speaking of "non-appropriated, non-public
funds", a term not found in any statute, appellant has
reference to two sources of funds:
1.

Those funds described in § 53-48-20(3) (d)
Utah Code Ann. (1953), which appellant has
called " . . . funds received from . . .
development contracts . . . ."

(Apprs Brief,

Pet. for Rehng., p. 3, title of Point II)
2.

Those funds described in § 53-32-4, which
appellant has called " . . . funds received
from individual grants. . . ."

(App's brief,

ibid).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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While it is true this court did not mention
the so-called individual grant funds of § 53-32-4, its
opinion considered and expressly rejected appellant's
contention that the so-called development contract
monies of § 53-48-20(3) (d) could be legally invested
in common stock.

See the last full paragraph on page

2 of the opinion.

Since the wording of § 53-48-20(3)i'
2/
is similar to the wording of § 53-32-4-, this
court's rejection of § 53-48-20(3) as statutory authority
for investment in common stock of the funds referred
to therein was also a tacit rejection of § 53-32-4
with respect to the funds specified therein.
II
USU DERIVED NO POWER FROM § 53-32-4 TO
INVEST DONATED MONIES IN COMMON STOCK
Even if this court's rejection of § 53-48-20
(3) as a source of statutory power to purchase common
stock did not effectively dispose of appellant's
reliance on § 53-32-4, that reliance is misplaced.

— "Any institution. . . engaged in a program
authorized by the Board may: ... (c)Accept contributions,
grants, or gifts. . . ; (d) Retain, accumulate, invest. . . the funds and proceeds of such authorized programs. . . ."
— "The Utah State Agricultural College [Utah
State University of Agriculture and Applied Science]
in its corporate capacity may take by purchase, grant,
gift, or devise or bequest any property. . . . Such
property so received. • • shall be held, invested
and managed. . . . "

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A.

Section 53-32-4 Does Not Define What In-

vestments Are Legal For Donated Monies But Only Makes
Them Eligible For Investment•
Appellant contends that § 53-32-4 empowers
USU to invest all property received by private donation
in any form of investment whatever including stock*
To construe this section as authorizing USU to invest
that category of funds in any and all kinds of
securities is to disregard the language of § 33-1-3,
discussed on pp. 22-25 of Respondent's Brief on appeal.
Section 33-1-3 envisions that other laws would supplement and refine those laws empowering agencies to
invest.

Section 53-32-4 is not the kind of law en-

visioned by § 33-1-3 in that it does not declare "what
shall be legal investments."

In other words, § 53-32-4

by itself does not empower USU to invest these monies;
it only makes them available for investment in "legal
investments" as otherwise "declared" by legislation.
Appellant's argument is defective in that it refuses to
acknowledge that for a state agency to invest money in
its custody in any securities, two things must be present.
First, there must be a statute empowering the agency
to invest enumerated funds in its possession; and
secondly, there must be a statute which enumerates the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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securities in which the agency can legally invest
those funds.

These two related but distinct powers,

typically, are found in tv/o separate statutes.

Thus,

a Wyoming statute, enacted four years before Utah
enacted § 33-1-1, states, in relevant part:
"It shall be lawful for the state
of Wyoming and • . . institutions
and agencies thereof, to invest
their funds and the moneys in their
custody or possession, eligible
for investment, in bonds and
debentures. . . of the Federal
Housing Administration, etc.
(emphasis added)" (Wyoming Senate
File No- 9, 1935).
Similarly, § 35-351, Arizona Revised Statutes
Annotated, states:
"The state treasurer. . .shall invest
. . . monies authorized by law to
be invested in securities as defined
by law, . . . in bonds of the
United ^States. . . etc. (emphasis
added)"
Finally, the Utah Legislature understands
the difference between statutory authority to invest at all, and statutory authority defining those
investments which are legal, having recognized that
difference in 1957 in adding a sentence to § 33-1-1
which read:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"any . . . officer of the state
government, empowered to make investments of the State Insurance Fund,
• . . is hereby authorized to invest
said funds in obligations or loans
insured by the Federal Housing Administration, etc. (emphasis added)"
The only thing done by § 53-32-4 for donated
monies is to make those funds eligible for investment
by the University; one must look elsewhere for a
list of legal investments for those funds. Although § 33-1-1 provides such a list, its list does
not include common stock.
To read Section 53-32-4 as defendants contend would logically require the court to hold that
the category of funds described therein could be
legally invested in anything? such a construction
flies in the teeth of the common law presumption that
a municipal corporation may not spend money for
speculation, and the public law canon of construction
that powers to contract for items other than necessaries
shall be strictly construed.

See pp. 21-22 of Respondent's

Brief on appeal.
B.

The Law Seeks To Safeguard Monies

Donated to a Public Entity to the Same Extent as
Monies Appropriated Thereto.
The fact that the monies referred to in
Section 53-32-4 have not been appropriated by the
Legislature, but rather come from other sources,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

does not render inapplicable the common lav;
("Dillons") rule that a public body has only those
powers specifically conferred upon it by statute.
Not only does logic require that monies given
voluntarily to USU receive the same protection
as monies given involuntarily through taxation but
the case law supports this proposition*
In State ex rel Davis v. Clausen, 160
Wash. 618, 295 Pac. 751, 757 (1931), the court
held that federal monies intended for Washington
State College but received by the state treasurer
were subject to a Washington statute prohibiting
the state treasurer from transferring monies to
the college without a legislative appropriation,
notwithstanding statutory language providing
that monies received from the United States for
the benefit of the college, when deposited with
the treasurer,
" . . . shall be held as special
funds for said college, and are
hereby appropriated to the uses
and purposes for which the same are
received."
The court held that money coming into the custody
of the state treasurer, although specifically ear-
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marked for the use of the State College and by statute
"appropriated to the uses and purposes" of the college,
partook of the same character as monies received by
the state treasurer from state appropriations in
the sense that only a legislative appropriation could
authorize the treasurer to disburse them out to
the college.
In Mahon v. Board of Education of City of
New York, 63 N.E. 1107 (N.Y., 1902), the court held
that a constitutional provision forbidding any city
to give money in aid of any individual applies to
money the city received from sources other than public
taxation*
In Storen v. Sexton, 209 Ind. 589, 200 N.E.
251 (1936) , the Indiana Supreme Court squarely held
that monies donated to Purdue University (a land
grant college, like USU) were to be treated the same
as state funds once they were received; therefore,
they could only be spent as the Legislature directed.
The court reasoned, at p. 261, as follows:
"When the trustors created the trusts
and placed them in the hands of public
officers they must be deemed to have
understood that the discretion of those
officers concerning the details of
safeguarding and preserving the corpus
of the trust, and insuring the safety

-7-
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and availability of current
funds, could be and might be
controlled by the Legislature,"
See also State ex rel. University of Utah
v. Candland, 36 Ut. 406, 425-426, 104 Pac. 285
(1909); University of North Carolina v> Maultsby,
43 N.C. 257, 264 (1852); and Trustees of the
University of Alabama v, Winston, 5 Stewart &
P. 17, (Ala., 1833) to the effect that property
owned by state-controlled universities (like
USU) is actually property of the state.
C.

Stocks Are Not Investments Within the

Meaning of § 53-32-4 (Dealing with "Donated Monies")
Passed in 1929.
Assuming, arguendo, that it is not necessary
to be able to point to another statute containing
a list of "legals" for "donated monies" (an
assumption USU has shown to be erroneous, above),
the brokers1 reliance on the language in § 53-32-4,
which states that USU may "invest" these monies,
is not well founded.
1929.

This statute was passed in

In ascertaining the intent of the legislature,

reference of course must be had to the commonly
accepted usage of words used in a bill at the time
the bill was passed.

The question then should be

asked, what did the word "invest" mean in 1929.
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Specifically, did it include the purchase of common
stock?

The answer is found in law dictionaries

of the day.

Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Third Re-

vision, published in 1914, contains only one definition of the word investment as follows:
"a sum of money left for safekeeping, subject to order, and
payable not in the specific money
deposited, but in an equal sum;
it may or may not bear interest,
according to the agreement."
State v. McFetridge, (Wise, 1893)
54 N'.W. 11
According to that definition, the deposit of money
in a bank is an investment, but the purchase of common
stock is not.
D.

The Sendak Case Is Hot Good Authority

That Donated Monies Are Eligible For Investment In
Stock.
In its brief, appellant refers to Sendak v.
Trustees of Indiana University, 254 Ind. 390, 260
N.E. 2d 601 (1970).

However, in that case, con-

trary to appellants1 assertion, the court did not
construe a statute "very similar" to § 53-32-4.
Indeed, the holding there that the trustees of
Indiana University could invest donated monies in
common stock was not based on any statute at all.
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In Sendak, the court was faced with the simple
question of whether Indiana University could
use donated monies to buy stock in a private
corporation without violating the Indiana Constitution prohibiting the State of Indiana from
becoming a stockholder in a private corporation.
The court concluded that it could do so, on
the ground that Indiana University had been held
to be a "private corporation" by prior decisions
and not part of the State; the monies, therefore, never became property of the State and thus
could be managed free from state restrictions.
260 N.E. 2d 601, 604.

In contrast, the Utah

Supreme Court has on two occasions soundly rejected the argument that USU (and the University
of Utah) are corporations separate and apart from
the State of Utah. University of Utah v. Board
3/
of Examiners, supra, p. 426.— Spence v. USAC, 119
U. 104, 113-114, 225 P.2d 18. Moreover, the Utah
Legislature has never believed that monies donated
to USU do not become subject to the control of
the state; this clearly appears from the passage
of an act in 1925, found in Chapter 16 of the
Session Laws for that year.
-/*

Section 6 of that

Utah 2d 408, 295 P.2d 348 (1956).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Act states, in relevant part:
"All monies received by the
University of : tah or the Agricultural College of Utah from any
source whatsoever; shall be paid
Tntb the state treasury at the close
of the months of June and December
of each year and shall be placed
to the credit of the maintenance
account of the respective institution." (all emphasis added)
The above statute was itself merely a rephrasing
of statutory language appearing as early as 1917.
At no time in the some thirty years or more that
language was law was it even challenged, let alone
held to be invalid.
E.

Section 53-32-4 Does Not Allow The

Donor To Determine How His Donation Is Thereafter
Invested,
Respondent understands appellant to argue
that the intent of § 53-32-4 was to authorize USU
to invest donated monies, or the proceeds of donated
properties converted into money, in a manner consistent
4/
with the desires of the donor.-If this is
—/ "The Utah Legislature made it clear in 1929
that it intended the Board of Trustees to use the
proceeds of private gfits, bequests and trusts in a
manner consonant with the conditions imposed by the
donors thereof, as the Sendak court held was the case
in Indiana." App!s Brief, Pet. for Rehrng., p. 8
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appellant's contention, it is not supported by the
language of the section.
reads:

The sentence in question

"Such property so received or converted

shall be held, invested and managed and the
proceeds thereof used by the, board of trustees
for the purposes and under the conditions prescribed in the grant or donation (emphasis
added)."

The language underlined surely refers

to the purposes for which the gift, devise or
bequest is ultimately intended, e.g. for the library,
scholarships, athletic program, etc.

In other

words, this language makes clear that not only
the corpus of a gift, devise or bequest should
be used "for the purposes and under the conditions"
prescribed in the gift but also the interest
(used in the wide sense of trust lav/) generated
by the corpus.

Thus, the terra "proceeds" as

used in this sentence means interest so defined.
Appellant further argues that § 51-7-13,
part of the State Money Management Act of 1974,
affords "funds from private sources the same
treatment, more complete and detailed, than [the
Legislature] had previously [in § 53-32-4]."

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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If

appellant means by this that § 53-32-4 allows
donors or testators to specify the manner in which
their donations are invested pending the application
of the gift, devise or bequest to the ultimate
university purposes specified, appellant's statement
is incorrect; for not even § 51-7-13 allows the
"dead-hand" of the testator to do this but merely
allows a donor or testator, by providing in
the terms of the gift, devise or bequest that it
shall not be invested in accordance with the rules
and regulations of the money management council, to
cause that the gift or grant be invested according
to the prudent man standard of § 33-2-1^/ As noted
in Storen v. Sexton, supra, benefactors of USU must be
deemed to have understood that the legislature might
impose rules to govern the safeguarding and preserving
of the corpus of their benefactions.

This observation

is equally true with respect to § 53-32-4, passed in
1929, as it is to § 51-7-13, passed in 1974. Under
neither section can a benefactor specify how he wants
his gift or grant invested once he has parted with it.
~/§ 51-7-13(b) reads:
"All funds acquired by gift, devise, or
bequest or by federal or private grant shall
be invested in accordance with the rules
and regulations of the council unless the terms
of the gift or grant provide otherwise, in
which event these funds shall be invested and
managed in accordance with the standards specified
in section 33-2-1."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Ill
EVEN IF SOME DONATED MONIES WERE
LEGALLY AVAILABLE FOR THE PURCHASE
OF STOCK, APPELLANT HAD THE DUTY
TO ASCERTAIN THAT THE MONIES USU'S
AGENT USED TO PURCHASE STOCK THROUGH
IT WERE IN FACT SUCH AVAILABLE
MONIES.
A.

Section 22-1-5 of the Utah Uniform

Fiduciaries Act Does Not Apply to these Facts,
Appellant argues from § 22-1-5 of the Utah
Uniform Fiduciaries Act that if only a fraction of
the funds in USU's investment pool were actually
available under lav; for the purchase of common
stock, then the purchase of stock with any funds
of the pool was legal. Apart from the obvious
fact that the salutary purpose for applying a
rule of strict statutory construction herein

—

the safeguarding and preservation of public
monies —

would be subverted if this argument

prevailed, § 22-1-5 does not even apply to the
facts of this case. As stated by this court in
Sugarhouse Finance v. Zions First National Bank,
21 Utah 2d 68, 440 P.2d 869 (1968):
"The purposes to be accomplished
by this [Uniform Fiduciaries] Act
would seem to be to facilitate
banking and financial transactions
by relieving the depositary banks
and others dealing with a fiduciary
from the duty imposed at common
law of seeing that fiduciary
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funds are properly applied to the
account of the principal. In
other words, the statute places a
duty upon principals to use only
honest fiduciaries, and gives
relief to those who deal with
fiduciaries except where they
know the fiduciary is breaching
his duty to his principal or
where they have knowledge of
such facts that their action in
dealing with the fiduciary
amounts to bad faith (emphasis
added)." 21 Utah 2d, pp. 69-70.
The operative language of § 22-1-5 relied upon
states that the "payee" of a check "is not bound
to inquire whether [a] fiduciary is committing a
breach of his obligation as fiduciary in drawing" the
check unless he takes the check with actual or constructive notice of the breach.

In the case at

hand, there was no issue of Catron, USU's investment
officer, breaching his obligation to USU under
§ 22-1-5 because he never drew the check (the stock
was never paid for).

But even if § 22-1-5 means more

than it says, Catron, still, breached no obligation even in ordering the stock.

On the theory

of this case as decided below, if some funds
in the investment pool were legally available
for common stock when he placed orders for the
stock, and the remainder was not, Catron did not

-15Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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know it; indeed, USUfs administration and Institutional Council believed all monies in the pool
could rightfully be used to purchase stock and
no allegation is made that Catron knew other6/
wise.—'
Appellant's argument based on § 22-1-5
of the Utah Uniform Fiduciaries Act is misconceived for yet another reason.

The purpose

of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act has been said
to be to harmonize the common lav/ theory that
one deals with a fiduciary at his peril "with
the provisions of the uniform negotiable in7/
7
struments act11—
; or as expressed by another
court, to "facilitate banking transactions by
relieving a depository . . . of the duty of
inquiry as to the right of its depositors,
even though fiduciaries, to check out their
8/
accounts."~
As yet another court noted:
—Appellant never alleged that USU had power
to invest in stock only funds from a specified
source,e.g. § 53-32-4 monies.
-'Wysowatcky v. Denver - Willys, 281 P.2d
165, 167 (Colo., 1955).
8/
Transport Trucking Company vs. First
National Bank in Albuquerque, 61 N.M. 320, 330
P.2d 476, 479 (1956") .

-16-
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"The Uniform Fiduciaries Act,
hereinafter called the Act, was
drawn by a committee of the
Conference on Uniform State
Laws, after a request by bankers
that a rule be made by statute
to determine when the form of
an instrument imposes a duty of
making inquiry upon persons
dealing with fiduciaries. It
was mentioned in the committee
reports to the conference that
there were general objections
to such a measure and also
specific objections to it as an
amendment of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, Nevertheless,
because of the appeal of the
banking interest and the general
feeling of the conference, the
committee felt under a duty to
proceed with the preparation of
a uniform act and let the conference weigh the arguments for and
against legislation on the subject. Professor Austin Scott
made a study of the question and
prepared a draft of the Act,
which wasQadopted substantially as
written."—
Appellant does not contend that, under the
facts of this case, banking transactions would
be hampered if § 22-1-5 were not applied.

Indeed,

appellant's argument would be the same whether
Catron intended to pay for the stock (it was
never paid for) with cash or by check.

In sum,

Guaranty Bank &>Trust Company of Alexandria vs. C & R Development Co., 241 So. 2d 14, 21
(La. App., 1970), dissenting opinion.
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appellant has cited a section of banking law
to reach a desired result in the context of
public lav; in which the section has no application.
To apply § 22-1-5 here, even assuming
§ 53-32-4 monies are legally available to
purchase stock, would be to both ignore the
purpose behind the Fiduciaries Act and to
open the door for subsequent raids on the public
treasury.

Appellant cannot be said to be

unduly burdened to see that public funds are
not spent for a purchase not authorized by law.
CONCLUSION
Contrary to appellant's assertion,
this court did in effect dispose of the argument —

on which the petition for rehearing is

almost solely based —

that § 53-32-4 empowered

USU to invest at least the monies specified
therein in stock.

If, however, the court's

failure to mention § 53-32-4 in its opinion
is not a result of the court assuming that its
discussion of § 53-48-20(3) would be understood
to apply, with appropriate changes to § 53-32-4,
independent reasons set forth above should compel
this court to reject the latter section as a
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statutory basis for investing in common stock
without the necessity of a rehearing.

Finally,

even if this court is persuaded that § 53-32-4
empowered USU to invest without restriction the
monies referred to therein, appellant is not
entitled to summary judgment based on § 2 2-1-5
(of the Utah Uniform Fiduciaries Act).
The petition for rehearing should be
denied.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
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DAVID L. WILKINSON
Special Trial Counsel
Utah Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Utah State
University
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